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Abstract—Banking as an essential service can be hard to
access in remote, rural regions where the network connectivity is
intermittent. Although micro-banking has been made possible by
SMS or USSD messages in some places, their security flaws and
session-based nature prevent them from a wider adoption. Global
level cryptocurrencies enable low-cost, secure and pervasive
money transferring among distributed peers, but are still limited
in their ability to reach more people in remote communities.
We proposed to take advantage of the delay-tolerant nature of
blockchains to deliver banking services to remote communities
that only connect to the broader Internet intermittently. Using a
base station that offers connectivity within the local area, regular
transaction processing is solely handled by blockchain miners.
The bank only joins to process currency exchange requests,
reward miners and track user balances when the connection is
available. By distributing the verification and storage tasks among
peers, our system design saves on the overall deployment and
operational costs without sacrificing the reliability and trustwor-
thiness. Through theoretical and empirical analysis, we provided
insights to system design, tested its robustness against network
disturbances, and demonstrated the feasibility of implementation
on off-the-shelf computers and mobile devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
Business operations in rural areas often face challenges
associated with access, due to the lack of infrastructures. Com-
munication infrastructure is one of the most crucial challenges,
as an increasing number of services today rely on continu-
ous network connectivity. However, connectivity in many of
those difficult-to-access areas, even when available, is often
intermittent. As a consequence, most of the pervasive services
that are taken for granted cannot operate in these connectivity-
restricted environments. This has led to the development of
techniques, such as ad-hoc networks, and applications that can
utilize the intermittent connection to provide some level of
service [29], [25] in the past. More recently, these regions
are beginning to be served by community-run small-cell base
stations for local connectivity, for example, Nokia Kuha [1]
base stations that enable connectivity to the broader internet
intermittently, but continuous interconnectivity for devices
located within its coverage.
One sector that has adopted different technologies avail-
able in these connectivity-restricted environments to deliver
valuable services, is banking. For example, primitive banking
services have been made possible via Short Message Service
(SMS) or Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD)
of cellular networks. This is exemplified by the BAAC in
Thailand [11] and M-Pesa in Kenya and Tanzania [21]. The
emergence of having interconnectivity within a given area,
e.g., a village, with intermittent access to the main operator
network, as well as decentralised services such as cryptocur-
rencies that do not require centralized control [19], [20],
has opened up possibilities for delivering improved banking
services to connectivity-restricted areas.
Indeed, cryptocurrencies have received a significant atten-
tion in recent years and are regarded by many as a potential
revolution of the banking industry [19], [20]. The technology
behind, the blockchain, is secured by hard-coded software
programs and enables peer democracy for transaction settle-
ment. However, like most other pervasive services of today,
cryptocurrencies require continuous network connectivity to
constantly exchange large volumes of data. For instance, a
typical Bitcoin client uses around 200 MB of data per hour
[2], while the Ethereum blockchain size has even surpassed the
Bitcoin’s in June 2017.1 Therefore, to take advantage of the
village-wide interconnectivity and the benefits of decentralisa-
tion, it is necessary to leverage the delay-tolerant characteristic
of the blockchain and extend it to operate in intermittently
connected environments.
This paper shows how this can be achieved by considering a
scenario where a community operates small-cell base stations
for local connectivity with intermittent connection to the
broader Internet, and a financial institution, i.e., a bank, that
supplies, pays for and monitors equipment used in providing
the service and makes the following contributions:
1) The design of a low-cost, accessible, reliable and
secure payment scheme based on the Ethereum
blockchain.
2) Mathematical models of the proposed system and an
evaluation of the system performance under several
operating conditions that confirms its feasibility.
3) Demonstrate the practical viability of proposed sys-
tem through a prototype implementation using off-
the-shelf laptops and mobile devices.
4) The first ever use of smart contracts for admission
control, management of user accounts, mining re-
wards, and token creation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section
II introduces technical details of blockchain. Section III de-
scribes the system architecture and Section IV provides models
for the system design. Section V presents the validation of our
models and evaluation over local blockchain system. Section
VI demonstrates a prototype implementation with multiple test
results. Section VII discusses the related work, Section VIII
highlights insights on future directions, and Section IX finally
concludes the paper.
1http://www.altcointoday.com/ethereums-blockchain-size-surpasses-bitcoins-by-40/
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II. BLOCKCHAIN BASICS
We base our system design on the Ethereum platform [31]
that incorporates a Turing-complete scripting language for
user-defined programs with a short block-generation time.
We here explain key terminology and describe the Ethereum
mechanisms.
A. Nodes and Their Connectivity
A blockchain consists of a peer-to-peer (P2P) communica-
tion overlay network. In the case of Ethereum, each network
node continuously attempts to connect to other nodes until they
have peers. By default, Ethereum nodes use a gossip protocol
to find out about other nodes.
Once the overlay network is created, nodes on a blockchain
may act as full nodes, miners or light nodes. All nodes
contribute to the network connectivity and information (i.e.,
transactions and blocks) propagation. Miners and full nodes
verify all transactions based on the signatures on them and
the state changes they result in, and each keeps a complete
transaction record. Light nodes operate in the Simplified Pay-
ment Verification (SPV) mode to only download block headers
and verify and store transactions that are related to them. In
addition, miners settle transactions through a process called
mining as explained in Part II-C.
B. Transactions, Blocks and Smart Contracts
The state of a blockchain is represented by peer interactions
or transactions. For simplicity and efficiency, transactions are
grouped together to be settled and immutably recorded in
blocks. A user needs an externally controlled account (EOA)
to send and receive transactions. An EOA has an ether balance
and is controlled by the user’s private key. Ethereum also uses
smart contracts to form agreements among different entities.
Smart contracts are identified by contract accounts, which are
similar to EOAs but are associated with code that can be
triggered by transactions or messages (calls) received from
other contracts. Transactions can be sent between two EOAs,
two contract accounts, or an EOA and a contract account. In
the public Ethereum network, miners also collect transaction
fees to make profit [31]. Transaction priority, i.e. how likely
a transaction is to be picked up by miners, depends mostly
on its value, age and the transaction fee attached. State of
a blockchain is computed after every block [4], and smart
contracts are executed by all nodes when synchronization
happens (cf. Part II-C).
C. The Blockchain
Nakamoto in his original paper proposed a proof-of-work
(PoW) scheme to confirm transactions and select representa-
tion in majority decision making [22]. PoW is also adopted by
the current version of Ethereum as described below.
1) PoW Mining and Difficulty Control: PoW mining is
essentially the process of repeatedly calculating a hash value
with an incrementing nonce until the hash is smaller than
a target. Hashrate is the speed at which a miner computes
hashes. Miners compete against each other in solving PoW
puzzles and broadcast blocks to the rest of the network upon
block creation for validation and synchronization. In addition
to mining, miners also listen for new transactions and blocks
discovered by others to prepare the next block.
Difficulty is a measure of how difficult it is to solve a
PoW puzzle. Difficulty adjustment over PoW puzzles leads
to a stable block creation rate. In Ethereum the calculation
is based on the block number, timestamp of the current
block, and timestamp & difficulty of its parent block. For
Ethereum Homestead,2 the adjustment is always a multiple
of parent_diff // 2048, with parameter a ∈ [−99, 1].
We denote block_timestamp - parent_timestamp
as δt, and summarize the adjustments in Table I. Difficulty
adjustment is insignificant under a high network hashrate.
Table I: PoW difficulty adjustments.
Timestamp difference Adjustment
δt < 10s a = 1
10s <= δt < 20s Difficulty unchanged, a = 0
20s <= δt < 1000s Adjust downwards proportional to δt,
a ∈ [−99,−1]
δt >= 1000s a = −99
2) Consensus and Chain Growth: Transmission delays may
lead to stale blocks, or forks [9] as multiple blocks could be
created at the same time, and received by different nodes across
the network. A block is attached to the chain once created, with
its own block header pointing to the previous block header,
and all the way back to the genesis block. All peers work out
these inconsistencies by selecting the longest chain. Ethereum
determines the longest chain based on the total difficulty of all
the blocks.3
3) Node Synchronization: Network delays and node churns
are common in blockchain systems. If one node restarts after
going off-chain, it enquires its peers to obtain the latest version
of the ledger. States stored in a particular block can only be
accessed if the node synchronization has reached it.
D. Coin Supply
To compensate the resources consumed in mining, a fixed
amount of new tokens, or mining reward, is generated upon
the creation of blocks and paid to the winners. This rewarding
scheme is necessary as it makes the blockchain more secure
[5], but the continuous creation of coins may result in inflation.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The primary objective of the proposed system is to enable
cash-less payment in a remote community that has constant
connectivity within the local area but only intermittent connec-
tion to the broader Internet. Namely, the community connects
to a bank’s central network intermittently. A network operator
deploys a base station, similar to Nokia Kuha [1] that forms
a 4G LTE cellular network in the local region. The backhaul
network could be a low-bandwidth satellite or a long-range
microwave connection that does not provide robust service
guarantees. Transaction processing is enabled using a private
Ethereum blockchain [31] deployed by the bank. We assume
some villagers would volunteer to participate in mining and
be chosen by the bank. We do not use the default ether
generation scheme to avoid inflation in the local economy,
but instead, create our own digital currency, or Token, 4 via
2http://ethdocs.org/en/latest/introduction/the-homestead-release.html
3Ethereum does not implement the full Greedy Heaviest-Observed Sub-Tree
(GHOST) protocol proposed by Sompolinsky and Zohar [30], instead, it uses
a longest-chain rule with rewards for stale blocks [12].
4https://www.ethereum.org/token
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a smart contract, for use within the community. The use of
Tokens automatically imposes restrictions on users entering
the system and makes it easier for the bank to manage user
accounts.
Figure 1a graphically illustrates our system design. The
bank authorizes a set of selected villagers to act as miners
and compensates them by assigning a certain number of
Tokens for each valid block they create. Regular users can
join the system by running a light node that is deployed as a
customized mobile app. All villagers, especially vendors, can
host a full node as a payment gateway to keep a complete
transaction record if they wish so. The detailed design of
the mining network, with the appropriate number of miners
and the minimal connectivity requirements for the system to
provide the intended service, is described in Section IV. The
distinguishing feature of the proposed system is that it enables
villagers with Tokens to perform regular transactions (txP,P
in Figure 1b) among themselves with all regular transactions
treated equally, processed and authorised by the blockchain
miners irrespective of the bank’s presence.
The bank itself hosts a passive full node to avoid creating
forks during its disconnection periods. It deploys a smart
contract, i.e. the user balance contract, to record user bal-
ances in both fiat currency and digital currency, as well as
distributing mining rewards. When the connection between the
bank and the village is established, the bank synchronizes with
other blockchain nodes, updates user balances and processes
currency exchange requests. These currency exchange transac-
tions (txB,P in Figure 1b) between the bank and villagers are
treated with a higher priority by the blockchain network as they
are only committed when the connection is available. The bank
also takes appropriate actions in case of malicious behaviors
such as suspicious transactions and misbehaving miners. As
a result, we have developed the first ever smart contract
responsible for the admission control, account management,
rewarding miners, and token creation.
Figure 1b illustrates transaction flows in the system. In order
to send a transaction, Regular User 1 first requests to load her
digital account with the money in her fiat account.5 The bank
then issues transaction txB,P , which is picked up by Miner 1
and included in Block #i. Once txB,P is confirmed, the code
inside the user balance contract is triggered and User 1’s fiat
account and digital account are updated accordingly as shown
in Step 1©. Next, User 1 sends Vendor 1 a transaction txP,P to
obtain the service, which is collected by Miner 2 and confirmed
in Block #i+1. During the bank’s next synchronization, once
it reaches Block #i+1, the smart contract code is triggered
again and the digital accounts of both User 1 and Vendor
1 are updated as shown in Step 2©. The bank also keeps
two accounts of itself, just like other blockchain nodes. If an
outside party without Tokens wants to make transactions with
people in the village, it first submits a request to the bank node
in fiat currency. The bank will then convert the payment to the
digital currency locally and redirect it to the target receiver
when the connection is available.
IV. SYSTEM MODELLING AND DESIGN
We first probabilistically model transaction processing of
the local blockchain system as it is a major concern of users.
5A fiat account records the amount of fiat currency a user deposits to the
bank.
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(b) Transaction Flows.
Figure 1: Overview of the proposed system.
We then model the overall deployment and operational costs
from the bank’s point of view and use the models to design
system properties to enable an efficient and reliable local area
payment scheme under the given network constraints.
A. Assumptions
We make the following assumptions without loss of gener-
ality:
1) All individual mining nodes have equal and stable
computational power as mining equipment are sup-
plied by the bank to authorised villagers.
2) Block size is sufficient to include all transactions for
immediate processing as the transaction rates within
a village will be considerably lower when compared
to a public Ethereum network.
3) No transaction fees and no rewards for mining stale
blocks as rewarding is controlled by the bank using
Tokens.
4) Network bandwidth available within the village is
sufficient for all blockchain related data traffic.
3
B. Modelling Transaction Processing
Regular transaction arrival rti , where ti is the transaction
initiation time, follows a Poisson distribution as observed in
[17]. We denote the average arrival rate as λt transactions
per second (tps). Block generation time T has been shown
to be exponentially distributed with probability density func-
tion G(T ) = λe−λT , where E[T ] = 1λ [9]. In Ethereum,
E[T ] ≈ 12s. Since we assume block size to be large enough
(cf. assumption 2), there are no pending transactions as all
transactions arriving in the current mining session are included
in the next block. Therefore, transaction processing time tp =
T−ti, where ti, tp ∈ (0, T ]. We further analyze the distribution
of block time and transaction processing time under different
arrival rates in Section V-B. Transaction throughput can also
be calculated as
∑
∀ti≤T rti
T , with transaction size being st
bits, blocks need to accommodate sb = λtstE[T ] bits of
transactions on average.
Then, there are money exchange transactions with the bank
when it is connected. We model money exchange transaction
proccessing similar to that of regular transactions with average
arrival rate λe and size se.
C. Modelling the System Cost
We derive cost models from the bank’s point of view for
capital equipment and operational costs based on metrics
in [8]. We omit transaction validation and storage costs in
our calculations as they are only a small fraction of mining
equipment cost and mining itself [8].
1) Equipment Cost: Mining equipment may come in differ-
ent forms. We use dm to denote cost of a mining equipment
and lm for total number of miners with a life time of xm
(in years). Then, the averaged equipment cost per year is
CE = lmdm/xm.
2) Rewarding Cost: Although the block reward is an incen-
tive for miners, it is an extra cost for the bank. We use R
to denote the block reward, meaning that bank has to pay R
Tokens for each valid block. We calculate the rewarding cost
as CR = nR, where n represents the number of blocks.
3) Network Resources: Since we assume ideal network con-
ditions (cf. assumption 4) locally, we only model the network
resource usage of the backhaul network. When connected,
the bank synchronizes past transactions and processes money
exchange requests. We define one service period as TB = TC+
TU , in which TC and TU stand for the cumulative total duration
of connected and disconnected sessions respectively during the
service period. We denote the backhaul network bandwidth
requirement as BW and cost as CBW in Token per bit. Then,
the network connectivity cost would be CN = CBWTCBW
during one service period.
4) System Cost: To sum up, the overall system cost bank has
to afford is the sum of all the aforementioned costs. Since cost
components are defined with different time units, we calculate
the overall cost within time period T0, which equals xy years,
xb blocks and xs service periods as:
CAll = CExy + CR + CNxs
= lm
dm
xm
xy +Rxb + CBWTCBWxs.
(1)
D. Mining Network Design
We now find ranges of multiple mining network parameters
including number of miners and their connectivity to ensure
reliability and security.
1) Miner Outages: Miners are incentivized to work, but they
may join or leave the network spontaneously (churn) [14].
We denote total number of online miners as lon, lon ≤ lm.
Probability of one miner going offline in each time slot is
p1, p2, p3, · · · , plm . Hence the probability that X = k miners
are offline in the same time slot can be represented by a
Poisson Binomial Distribution:
Pr(X = k) =
∑
A∈Fk
∏
i∈A
pi
∏
j∈Ac
(1− pj), (2)
where Set Fk contains all subsets of k integers that can be
selected from {1, 2, 3, · · · , lm}, and A and Ac are comple-
mentary. If all miners have the same chance of going offline,
i.e. p1 = p2 = p3 = · · · = plm = pd, the expectation of lon is:
E[lon] = lm − E[X] = lm(1− pd), (3)
or equivalently,
lm =
E[X]
pd
=
E[lon]
1− pd . (4)
We demonstrate how network churn affects the blockchain
system performance in Section V-C.
2) Mining Reward: Bank determines the mining reward R
according to the status of local economy and its budget. It
becomes harder for each individual miner to find a valid block
when there are more competitors (cf. assumption 1). As the
expected reward reduces, mining becomes less profitable. We
here calculate the maximum number of miners allowed to keep
them incentivized. We denote the mining cost as η per hash,
similar to the one in [28]. With individual hash rate being h,
each miner’s operational cost per second is ηh. The expected
hash cost of the entire network per second CH when all miner
are online (worst case) is CH = lmηh. Since miners are equal,
their expected revenue per mining round is hence R′ = R/lm.
We do not consider rewards provided for stale blocks (cf.
assumption 3). We derive the expected profit per mined block
for each individual as:
Π = R′ − CHT
lm
=
R
lm
− ηhT. (5)
Clearly, for mining to be profitable, Π should be greater than
0, i.e. lm and R should satisfy:
lm <
R
ηhT
. (6)
3) Minimal Connectivity Requirement: A key factor of
blockchains is the synchronization across the network, i.e.
every node should obtain a copy of the ledger. Individual
miners may want to reduce their data usage by connecting to
fewer other nodes, but with security considerations all miners
are encouraged to connect to as many other peers as possible.
We here provide an intuitive picture on the minimal direct con-
nections required for efficient information propagation across
the network. For the simplicity of analysis, we assume on
average every miner maintains connections with lc other nodes,
0 < lc ≤ lm. Once Miner A receives a transaction or a block,
she sends it to all the directly connected nodes. The same
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procedure repeats until the message reaches every node in the
network. We define information propagation from one network
node to another as a hop. Restricting maximum number of hops
to k, we obtain:
1 + lc + lc(lc − 1) + · · ·+ lc(lc − 1)k−1
= 1 + lc
k−1∑
i=0
(lc − 1)i ≥ lm.
(7)
Solving Equation 7 under given k and lm (not lon as eventually
all miners will store the blockchain), we obtain γ, fraction of
nodes that one should directly connect to as:
γ ≥ min (lc)
lm
. (8)
E. Summary
Although the bank has every intention to have fewer mining
nodes to reduce the equipment cost, there should be sufficient
miners to keep the fairness of the system and meet the
security requirements. The bank should also combine real-
world churn rate data and equipment costs to determine the
number of mining nodes needed and device type according
to particular use cases. Furthermore, all villagers, especially
miners, are recommended to increase their connectivity for
a better synchronization even though this leads to higher
bandwidth usage.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we first validate our transaction processing
model by comparing it to a real deployment of a private
Ethereum blockchain and make predictions about the system
behaviour based on the validated model. We also dimension
the local blockchain network design by identifying the minimal
average connection required for each mining node. Finally, we
evaluate the blockchain performance under various Network
Delays and Network Churns on the experimental deployment.
A. Experimental Environment
We have deployed a private Ethereum blockchain residing
on multiple virtual machines running Ubuntu Linux v16.04 in
an Openstack environment.6 Each virtual machine is given 1
virtual CPU core, 2 GB of memory, and 10 GB of persistent
storage to meet the minimum hardware requirement for run-
ning Ethereum. Elastic Search7 was used to store block-related
information. The network behaviour was monitored using the
Python Web3 Library.8
All virtual machines are linked together in a low-latency
local network that can be customized on demand. Our setup
peers every node using a single Gigabit Ethernet switch
and forms a star topology similar to the cellular network in
Figure 1a. With this setup, a communication round-trip time
between every two nodes is less than 1 ms on average. We
employ Linux traffic control to introduce delays to emulate
high latency in mobile networks and configure the Linux kernel
firewall with Iptables9 to emulate churns.
6https://www.openstack.org
7https://www.elastic.co
8https://web3py.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html
9https://help.ubuntu.com/community/IptablesHowTo
We have used Geth v1.6.4 10 for all of our empirical eval-
uations. Before the actual experimentation, we let the system
stabilize for a few hours to obtain appropriate parameters of
the genesis block in later runs. Based on our observation,
we set the initial nonce value, gas limit and difficulty to
0x42, 0x08000000, 0x400000 respectively to make the system
stabilize quickly. To form a fully connected P2P blockchain
network, we disabled the auto-discovery feature supported by
Geth and configured the overlay network manually. Finally, if
not mentioned otherwise, all experiments involved 10 mining
nodes and 10 light nodes.
B. Model Validation and Numerical Sensitivity Analysis
1) Model Validation: To validate our model in Section IV-B,
we emulated a transaction processing scenario by issuing
transactions at 1 tps (overall rate) from multiple clients to
randomly selected addresses. We sort block timestamps in
ascending order and calculate block generation time as the
difference between two adjacent timestamps. To obtain transac-
tion processing time, we record the timestamp upon initiation
of a transaction and extract the inclusion timestamp from
the transaction receipt. Figure 2a and Figure 2b present the
simulation and emulation results of 500 consecutive blocks
on block time and transaction processing time respectively.
Both illustrate a strong agreement between modelling and
experimental measurements. Additionally, an inter-comparison
between Figure 2a and Figure 2b confirms that transaction
processing and block generation are highly correlated.
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Figure 2: Model validation in terms of block generation and
transaction processing at 1tps.
2) Impact of Transaction Arrival Rate: We then intended
to empirically study the impact of transaction rate on trans-
action processing and benchmark the local blockchain per-
formance. However, when increasing the arrival rate, we hit
the transaction sending limit before the processing limit due
to implementation bugs in the Ethereum version we used.
Indeed, with more than 3 tps, the transaction generator stopped
working due to connection errors as the algorithm thinks some
nodes are flooding the system with too many requests. Despite
the transaction generator worked smoothly under lower arrival
rates, in the end only 4246 out of 17265 transactions were
mined at 2 tps. We hence decided to analytically study the
system behaviour under multiple transaction rates.
Using the validated model in Part V-B1, we further gener-
ated transactions at various rates including 0.2 tps, 1 tps, 5 tps,
and 25 tps in our simulation. Figure 3a and Figure 3b compares
the 50th, 70th, 90th, 95th and 99th percentiles of block time
10https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum
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Figure 3: Simulation with multiple transaction rates.
and transaction processing time under all the simulated arrival
rates. These results confirm that with a sufficient block size,
block creation time and transaction processing time are not
affected by the arrival rate.
3) Minimal Connection Requirement: Based on the analysis
presented in Part IV-D3, we obtain the minimal connection
requirement when varying number of hops k from 1 to 4 in
(7) with a total number of miners lm increasing from 4 to
100. Figure 4 displays the results in the number of nodes and
fraction of the network. As the left-hand side of (7) increases
exponentially with lc, minimum lc that satisfies the equation
may remain unchanged for a range of lm, which results in steps
or spikes on the curves. As shown in Figure 4a, when k = 2,
with a total of 100 miners, each individual needs to maintain
at least 10 connections. When k = 3, the minimum number of
connections required reduces to 4. Generally speaking, if only
one hop is allowed for information propagation, all miners
need to connect with all other miners. While if more hops
are allowed, miners can limit their connections to reasonably
small values to save the bandwidth usage. This indicates
the system’s ability to scale without miners exhausting their
network resources.
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Figure 4: Minimal connection requirement.
C. Effect of Network Disturbances
To further evaluate the performance of the local blockchain
network, we investigate its behavior under disturbances such as
Network Delays and Network Churns. Since it was impossible
to obtain the whole picture from transaction processing (cf.
Part V-B2), we have considered block generation time to be
an alternative evaluation metric (cf. Part V-B1).
1) The (non)Impact of Network Delays: In order to un-
derstand the stability of our proposal when inter-node delay
increases, we introduced various delays including 0, 10 ms,
50 ms, 100 ms, 500 ms, 1000 ms per connectivity channel.11
Figure 5a shows the 50th, 70th, 90th, 95th, 99th percentiles
of block time, from which we can see block time stays
stable even with delays reaching 1 second. We ascribe this
to PoW difficulty adjustment where network delay causes
time difference between two adjacent blocks to increase, the
internal algorithm reduces difficulty level to achieve a shorter
block time. Figure 5b illustrates block difficulty under multiple
network delays. A decreasing trend can be observed in the
difficulty level when delay increases. This behaviour helps to
maintain the transaction processing speed, but is “unhealthy”
because with a fixed total network hash rate, a lower difficulty
level leads to more stale blocks and inconsistencies.
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Figure 5: System behaviour with network delays.
2) Network Churns:
a) Transient Response: One of the main characteristic
of P2P networks concerns the churn rate of their nodes. We
emulated a scenario in which some miners go offline at time
t0 and observed variation in block creation time. As shown
in Figure 6, when some miners become offline, block time
experiences a significant increase followed by a “resolving
period” during which PoW difficulty is adjusted in response
to changes in network hash rate. To find the end point of the
“resolving period”, we select the timestamp from which the
absolute variation is less than 5% for the next 3 consecutive
points. Duration of “resolving period” is measured as 361 s,
781 s, 577 s, 527 s, 969 s respectively. Overall, it increases
with the number of offline nodes. While the network recovers,
we have also observed the behaviour of “backwards mining”,
meaning that newer blocks sometimes have smaller block
number than older ones. The disagreement is resolved with
the stabilization of the network.
11Today’s mobile network delays can hardly go beyond 1 second: https:
//hpbn.co/mobile-networks/
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Figure 6: Transient response to mining nodes going offline.
b) Changes Over Time: We then tested system perfor-
mance when each miner has a churn rate of 10%, 20%,
30%, 40% and 50%. We ran each set of experiment for
approximately 2 hours and changed miner status (online or
offline) every 20 minutes. Figure 7 shows the 50th, 70th, 90th,
95th, 99th percentiles of block generation time, from which we
can see block time does not vary much across all churn rates.
In other words, number of miners do not affect speed of block
generation or transaction processing.
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Figure 7: System steady-state behaviour with network churns.
3) Summary: Despite being unable to test the processing
limitation due to Ethereum implementation flaws and obtain
all transactional data experimentally, we managed to study the
effect of network disturbances from block time. Difference
between empty blocks and blocks with transactions mainly lies
in block size, hence the additional transmission delay which
is expected to have similar impacts to network delays. Results
show that delays and churns may cause block generation time
to change especially in the transient state, however, due to
the difficulty adjustment they do not necessarily slow down
block generation in the long run. Overall, the main observed
drawback of the local blockchain is that disturbances may
cause more temporary inconsistencies.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we demonstrate the feasibility of the system
design with a prototype implementation containing a private
Ethereum blockchain and an intermittently connected bank full
node. We tested the synchronization delay of the bank node
when varying the bandwidth and disconnection duration. We
also measured the usage of data, CPU, and battery of the
mobile wallet app using DDMS 12 and Battery Historian. 13
A. Setup
Figure 8 illustrates the setup with a bank full node, 2 shops,
and 3 regular users. Each shop runs a mining node and in
addition, Shop 1 owns two full nodes and Shop 2 owns one
full node. Regular User 3 operates a miner while the other
two regular users are light mobile clients. We summarize the
device types, capabilities and Geth versions in Table II.
Table II: Devices and their capabilities.
Miner Full node(including bank) Light node
Device Dell Latitude 6430u Raspberry Pi 3 Google Pixel XL
# of nodes 3 4 2
OS Ubuntu 17.04 Raspbian Jessie Android v8.0.0
RAM 4GB 1GB 4GB
Geth v1.6.5 v1.6.5 v1.6.7
We used a D-Link DSR-250N Wi-Fi router connecting to
the Oulu public WAN network (PanOULU) [24] to represent
the community base station. We used an IEEE 802.11n Wi-
Fi network to interconnect the above nodes except the bank
node which is directly connected to the PanOULU network and
periodically joins the blockchain via the Wi-Fi router’s public
network interface. We configured the bank node’s backhaul
bandwidth via the router’s WAN port. We used the auto-
discovery protocol of Geth on all nodes.
Figure 8: Prototype implementation.
We developed a smart contract as the wallet app in Solidity
v0.4.12 to create fiat and digital user accounts as well as a
special Token to perform functions including token supply,
token conversion, token transferring and miner rewarding as
described in Section III.
12https://developer.android.com/studio/profile/ddms.html
13https://developer.android.com/studio/profile/battery-historian.html
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B. Experiments
1) Bank Node Synchronization Delay: We measured bank
synchronization delay (i.e. time taken to update the bank node)
while increasing the backhaul bandwidth from 128 Kbps to 10
Mbps. We maintained a constant transaction rate of 2 tps and
varied the disconnection time from 1 min to 10 min. Figure 9a
illustrates the averaged synchronization delay and variation
over 10 runs of each scenario, where synchronization delay
is roughly proportional to the disconnection duration under
each a fixed backhaul bandwidth.
2) Mobile Wallet Performance: We then measured data,
CPU and battery used by the mobile wallet in its idle state (i.e.
Inactive mode) and when it sends one transaction per minute
(i.e. Active mode) for a total of one hour. Note that without
sending any transactions, the mobile light client continuously
synchronizes with the network and downloads block headers.
As shown in Figure 9b, our wallet app uses only 2.71 MB in
total in its idle state, and an additional 21.65 KB to perform
one transaction per minute. The overall CPU usage increased
from 51.9 s to 127.7 s within the one-hour period. When it
comes to power consumption, the wallet used 3.2 mAh or
0.04% of the mobile phone’s total battery usage in its idle
state and 19.8 mAh or 0.11% when sending transactions. These
results confirm our wallet app requires low bandwidth, CPU
processing and power for its operations compared to available
cryptocurrency clients [2].
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Figure 9: Test results on prototype implementation.
VII. RELATED WORK
We categorize related work into i) Pervasive, Delay-Tolerant
Networks, ii) Micro-Payment Systems, and iii) Blockchain
Cost Models.
i) Pervasive, Delay-Tolerant Networks: Blattman et al. [3]
found delay-tolerant networks are sufficient for digital services
to meet the needs of most rural communities. Pentland et
al. [25] later developed DakNet that uses a pervasive mobile
coverage to enable asynchronous digital services in India
and northern Cambodia. DakNet is remarkably low-cost and
well-received by local users and is more accessible than a
centralised, community telephone. The success of DakNet has
proven that decentralization is an effective way to deliver
service to remote regions.
ii) Micro-Payment Systems: A number of micro-payment
schemes were proposed in the mid-to-late 1990s. Some of
them leverage SMS or USSD of the cellular networks, for
instance, the BAAC in Thailand [11] and the M-Pesa Service
in Kenya [21]. However, SMS messages are easily spoofable
and hence require additional user verifications for security,
and USSD could be affected by session time-outs. Other
micro-banking systems are the early-generation token payment
platforms secured by time-lock puzzles, e.g. PayWord and
MicroMint [27]. IBM also proposed a Micro-iKP protocol
for frequent micro-payments [13] using “coupons" sent be-
tween players and verified by the bank. This scheme how-
ever, increases the communication cost. Bitcoin [22], the first
successful P2P cryptocurrency, was established in 2009 and
has received great attention. Other alternative coins such as
Ethereum [31] and Dogecoin were later developed. Although
blockchain was originally designed to operate without cen-
tralised authorities, many major banks nowadays are also
interested in using it to collaboratively settle transactions. 14
iii) Blockchain Cost Models: Croman et al. [8] did a reality
check of Bitcoin and analyzed the cost to confirm transactions.
Rimba et al. [26] later proposed cost models using parameters
such as gas and gasPrice to compare Ethereum with cloud
services for business process execution. We stick to findings
in [8] to obtain deployment and operation costs as the gas-
related parameters can be controlled by the bank.
VIII. DISCUSSION
By now we have demonstrated the design of a hy-
brid, blockchain-based payment scheme in an intermittently-
connected environment. Although the ultimate control belongs
to the bank, the reliable operation of the system is achieved via
decentralization. Our system benefits all participants. Villagers
are genuinely motivated to join as they can make low-fee,
cash-less transactions efficiently. Miners are incentivised to
work and receive rewards. By managing users’ digital and fiat
accounts, the bank can make a profit in a traditional way. While
with a distributed, self-regulated blockchain for transaction
processing, the bank can avoid single points of failure, and
enjoys a lower deployment cost compared to building physical
infrastructures and hiring experienced staff. However, some
aspects of the system design can be further improved.
A. Blockchain Inefficiency
PoW is a heavy consensus algorithm, and it becomes
more inefficient in public cryptocurrencies as players compete
against each other to earn profits. However, it does not appear
to be a problem in our implementation with low-power mining
nodes. One of the most promising replacements is the Proof-
of-Stake (PoS) proposed by King et al. [18]. The idea is to
assign mining rights based on the “coin-age", which equals
the currency amount times its holding period. More recent pro-
posals include Bitcoin-NG [10] that utilizes “leader selection"
and “micro-blocks", LocalCoin [6] which operates on mobile
devices without the Internet, and the Red Belly Blockchain
[7] which incorporates a fast, leader-free Byzantine consensus.
However, as PoS and other protocols also have vulnerabilities
[15], we expect PoW to continue being the main consensus
algorithm in blockchain-type systems in the near future.
B. Security Considerations
1) Temporary Inconsistency (not a real threat): Even though
blockchain forks or stale blocks are an important indicator of
inconsistency [9], if everyone behaves honestly, eventually all
conflicts can be resolved. Hence, stale blocks themselves are
14https://www.reuters.com/article/us-blockchain-banks/
six-big-banks-join-blockchain-digital-cash-settlement-project-idUSKCN1BB0UA
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not a direct threat to network security. However, they increase
the chance of double-spend attacks that are usually caused by
disagreements within the network [12].
Countermeasure: As suggested by Karame et al. [16], one
way to mitigate double-spend attacks is to apply a “listening
period" of a few seconds on the recepient side. This can be
integrated into the mobile wallet design.
2) Network Partitioning (a real threat): Wust et al. [32]
managed to perform an eclipse attack on a private ethereum
blockchain and Natoli et al. [23] leveraged the network parti-
tioning to perform the balanced attack.
Countermeasure: In our private blockchain setting, the per-
mitted miners may turn malicious at a later time. To enhance
security, we can enable the bank to deploy a smart contract that
tracks node connections and detects network partitioning. We
here present a simple method described as follows. We start off
with a randomly selected miner m1 belonging to the set N =
{m1,m2,m3, · · · ,mlm}. Miners that are connected directly
to m1 belong to the set P1 = {m2,m3,m4, · · · ,mk}. For
each element in P1, we obtain similar sets of P2, P3, etc. This
process is repeated until we find a set Px ∈ P1∪P2∪· · ·∪Px−1.
If there are still remaining elements, i.e. Px ⊂ N , a subgraph
is detected. When the bank is connected, it accesses the results
generated by this smart contract. The bank can then take action,
e.g. to force nodes in the subgraph to restart and establish new
connections. Note that this method does not prevent attacks or
take effect in real-time.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a blockchain-based payment
scheme in a remote region setting which has intermittent
connectivity to the bank’s central system. To do so, we have
introduced a novel way of using smart contracts by making
them responsible for the admission control of the system,
account management, mining rewards, and token creation. We
developed mathematical models to analyze system dynamics
and the costs for setup and operations. We validated the
proposed models on a private Ethereum testbed and demon-
strated the practicality of system design using laptops and
mobile devices. Through a comprehensive study of the local
blockchain operation, we showed its stability under network
disturbances. We then demonstrated the whole system op-
erates well in resource-constrained, dynamic, intermittently
connected environments. Future work will address the security
issues further, but we are confident that the security threats will
not be a major bottleneck in realizing our proposal.
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